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Landscape for Change?  














A deep and rapid de-carbonisation of the world’s energy systems is essential to meeting 
international goals for addressing climate change. But what is the role of the climate regime in 
facilitating such transitions? How do assumptions built into existing climate policy about how, 
when, why and for whom energy transitions are unfolding relate to practice on the ground? 
How far do they help or hinder the critical task of supporting and orchestrating society-wide 
efforts to reduce fossil fuel use?  In this paper, we examine how core assumptions concerning 
the role of the nation state, of carbon markets and finance, and of technology built into 
international climate policy are being challenged by the realities of how transitions in the 
energy systems are unfolding. Drawing on the critical region of Sub-Saharan Africa and 
empirical research in Mozambique and South Africa, we examine the challenges facing energy 
transitions and the potential for international climate policy to foster new trajectories towards 
decarbonisation.  
 
Policy Relevance  
The international regime for climate policy has been in place for some twenty years. Despite 
significant changes in the landscape of energy systems and drivers of global GHG emissions 
over this time, the core principles and tools remain relatively stable – national governments, 
carbon markets, project-based climate finance and the transfer of technological hardware. 
Given the diversity of actors and drivers and the limited direct reach and influence of 
international climate policy, however, there is an urgent need to consider how the climate 
regime can best support the embryonic transitions in the provision of energy, transport, 
industry, agriculture and housing that are slowly taking form around the world. To do this 
effectively, we have argued, requires a more nuanced understanding of the role of state in 
governing transitions beyond notions of a cohesive state serving as rule-enforcer and transition 
manager. It also requires a broader view of technology, not just as hardware that is transferred, 
but as a set of practices and networks of expertise and enabling actors. And while markets have 
an important role to play as vehicles for achieving broader ends, they are not an end in 
themselves. Finally on finance, while acknowledging the important role of climate aid, often 
as a multiplier or facilitator of more ambitious private, flows, it is critical to differentiate 
between the types of finance required for different transitions, some of which will be counted 
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under the climate regime and directed by it, but the majority of which will not. In sum, the 
(low) carbon economy is being built in ways and in numerous sites that the climate regime 
needs to be cognisant of and engage with productively, and this may require fundamental 
reconsideration of the building blocks of the international climate regime. 
 
Key words 






1. Introduction  
 
In June 2015 the G8 declared its intention to phase out the use of fossil fuels by the end of the 
century, affirming the need for radical decarbonisation in order to respond to climate change. 
Now entering their 25th year, the international climate change negotiations continue to be at the 
heart of this global response. Yet this landscape is changing. Once dominated by the pursuit of 
global targets and timetables, national governments now declare INDCs (Intended Nationally-
Determined Contributions) for reducing GHG emissions. At the same time  a host of other 
actors, from cities to corporations, regional governments to civil society organisations are being 
heralded as central to achieving progress and their actions tracked within the Non State Actor 
Zone for Climate Action. The importance of engaging a range of actors and sites in the 
transition to a low carbon economy is now making its presence felt in the international climate 
policy regime.  Yet the extent to which this shift from the mega-multilateralism that has 
dominated international environmental policy for the past two decades raises challenges for the 
fundamental principles and measures upon which global responses are being sought has yet to 
be scrutinised. 
 
In this paper we seek to open up this question. At the heart of the climate negotiations are 
fundamental questions of securing national level action, developing carbon markets and other 
sources of finance, as well as facilitating the development and transfer of technology. We 
suggest that in each case the realities of how energy system transitions so vital to delivering 
international goals are unfolding raise significant challenges to the assumptions upon which 
such frameworks are being built. In short, it is not only that new actors are needed, but also the 
means through which low carbon transitions are (and are not) being pursued need to be 
rethought.  
 
Research focusing on the development and contestation of climate policy has tended to neglect 
the ways in which socio-technical systems both structure and open up the possibilities for 
decarbonisation. In contrast, research on socio-technical transitions has focused on how 
existing incumbent systems might come under pressure or be reshaped through processes of 
innovation. Transitions studies have examined how both social and technical innovations come 
to be incorporated in or challenge dominant systems and how change occurs, with less explicit 
interest in the dynamics of power and politics through which such transitions are forged and 
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resisted. In this sense, questions of climate policy and politics have been relegated to a general 
landscape pressure on existing socio-technical systems and relatively absent from the study of 
intricacies of transition processes in particular sectors or places.  
 
In this paper, we seek to bring the changing nature of international climate policy and the 
realities of energy transition into conversation. We explore this interface through recent 
research on energy system transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Kenya, South 
Africa and Mozambique. These countries are experiencing competing energy trajectories 
supported by different actors, along more or less carbon intensive lines. Rather than being 
confined to the work of national government or international development agencies, in each 
case the role of foreign investment and transnational corporations, including those of the so-
called ‘rising powers’, such as China, India and Brazil whose industrialising economies have 
experienced significant economic expansion over the past decade, is fundamental in shaping 
carbon trajectories. While there has been growing attention in the climate policy literature to 
the domestic politics of climate change and low carbon transitions in these countries (Dubash 
et 2013; Pegels 2014), we argue that further attention needs to be paid to their international 
role in order to understand the possibilities and limitations for climate action. Moreover, across 
Kenya, Mozambique and South Africa there are different levels of connection to the market, 
finance, and technology mechanisms associated with the climate regime, allowing for further 
comparison as to the extent to which it can support ‘local’ decarbonisation strategies across 
diverse institutional settings and uneven levels of economic development. This raises questions 
as to whether and how the global climate regime can support and enable low carbon transitions. 
 
The research underpinning this analysis is informed by two parallel projects in which 178 
interviews were undertaken in Mozambique, South Africa, China, India and Brazil during 
2012-2014 and by the creation of a database of low carbon energy projects in South Africa and 
Mozambique. The data was gathered using energy finance datasets (such as Bloomberg Energy 
Finance), policy reports, press releases and web-based sources and then triangulated with 
findings from interviews and project site visits. The research in Kenya involved a further 29 
interviews with government officials, donors and businesses conducted during 2013 and 
reflections gleaned from a dissemination event on the research held in Nairobi in 2014. For 
reasons of space the evidence from these cases is necessarily used to illustrate the broader 
schisms between international climate policy and the practice of transitions in these settings 
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rather than provide a more systematically comparative account of energy transitions across the 
three countries.  
 
 
2. International Climate Policy and Low Carbon Transitions 
 
The global landscape of carbon emissions that confronted policy-makers in the early days of 
seeking to negotiate an international agreement was relatively straightforward. Countries could 
be divided into those whose economies had contributed to current levels of GHG emissions 
and those who had not yet made a significant imprint. Fast forward a quarter of a century and 
the picture is rather different. Economic development and the changing nature of production 
and consumption have reshaped this landscape in fundamental ways such that the lines between 
the ‘North’ and the ‘South’ have become blurred. Furthermore, while international policy has 
remained focused on the language of pollution control and the protection of the atmospheric 
commons, in other arenas the mantra is one of developing pathways to low carbon economies 
or enabling ‘deep de-carbonisation’ (IDDRI 2014). Ostensibly of course one requires the other. 
Yet despite this mutual interdependence, the premises upon which policy design is based to 
forge international agreement on the one hand, and the conditions in which low carbon 
transitions are emerging on the other, diverge in ways that potentially undermine the potential 
for international climate policy to deliver effective emissions reductions, especially beyond 
‘Annex 1’ countries.  
 
Under the international climate regime, the route towards mitigation for countries beyond the 
OECD is seen to lie in three key areas: the development of national policy responses; the 
emergence of carbon markets and other forms of climate finance; and mechanisms for 
technology transfer (UNFCCC 2014; TEC 2015). The focus on the nation-state as the primary 
actor who can leverage the policy and investment changes required is fundamental to the 
architecture of the climate change regime. Establishing effective carbon markets and forms of 
finance have been a long-standing tenant of the international policy regime. Negotiations at 
Paris  placed a large emphasis on new market mechanisms and around the world a range of 
emissions trading systems are being established in places as diverse as California, China, 
Mexico and Kazakhstan. Further, over the past five years emphasis has been on the need to 
release the level and kinds of financing required to invest in low carbon technologies and 
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infrastructure. Central to these discussions have been the Green Climate Fund resulting from 
the Copenhagen Accord whereby developed countries committed to mobilizing jointly 100 
billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries, including both 
public and private funds for climate change mitigation and adaptation. This is alongside the 
launch of new regionally relevant initiatives at Paris for financing low carbon energy such as 
the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI) which aims to build at least 100GW of new 
and additional renewable energy generation capacity by 2020, and 300GW by 2030. 
Technology transfer has similarly been central to the development of the international climate 
policy regime over the past two decades and since the Thirteenth Conference of the Parties 
(COP 13) in Bali, technology transfer and the principle that less economically developed 
countries should benefit from low cost, clean technologies as they seek to reduce their 
emissions has also become one of the pillars of the climate change regime. .  
 
Over the past two decades, international climate policy has emphasised a state-led, finance-
driven model of technology deployment where it is assumed that by establishing the 
appropriate costs of carbon and making these visible together with providing specific support 
for alternative energy sources (and other industrial processes) a market-led transition to a new 
low carbon economy can be forthcoming (OECD 2013; World Bank 2012). Yet this model has 
been troubled both by the empirical realities of how, where and by whom low carbon transitions 
are emerging, but also by critiques of their underlying assumptions. The ongoing emphasis 
upon markets as a means of realising low carbon transitions continues in spite of the poor 
performance of carbon trading to date, the very low price of carbon world-wide and the low 
levels of activity in the CDM, once thought to be the success story of the Kyoto Protocol. This 
experience suggests, at the very least, that policy design and delivery in this area has not 
adequately accounted for the relationship between establishing market mechanisms and the 
political economies and practices of decarbonisation.  
 
Equally fundamentally, it has been argued that current approaches to technology transfer are 
constrained by a lack of engagement with the role of the private sector, an assumption that 
technology primarily flows from countries in the ‘North’ to those in the ‘South’, and a limited 
evaluation of the impacts of the transfer of technology as ‘hardware’ rather than ‘software’ 
(Pueyo et al. 2012; Ockwell and Mallett 2012) where there has been a lack of attention to the 
institutional and social dimensions of innovation (De Coninck and Sagar 2014: 2-3). Counter 
to the dominant narrative within international climate policy, transition studies suggest that 
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innovation is an ongoing processes and that while finance and technology are necessary 
conditions for transition, they are far from sufficient (Kern 2011).  
 
With the emergence within the IPCC and the GCF of the language of transformative change, 
in which paradigmatic shifts towards low carbon and climate resilient forms of development 
are regarded as the goal of interventions, there is an increasing engagement with the notion of 
transition within the climate policy field (Winkler and Dubash 2015). We suggest that 
understanding how and why transitions to low carbon economies are unfolding in different 
national contexts can provide further insight into how and why the international climate policy 
regime may or may not be effective in furthering its own goals.  
 
 
3. The Case of Sub-Saharan Africa  
 
The trajectories of energy transitions in Sub-Saharan Africa are both little understood and 
increasingly in focus. From economic powerhouses such as South Africa to countries such as 
Mozambique, Rwanda and Kenya where national action plans on climate change are being 
developed as part of a donor drive to promote ‘climate-compatible development’ (Mitchell and 
Maxwell 2010), the energy trajectories of African countries are complex and highly 
differentiated, providing useful insights about whether and how international climate policy 
can support transitions to a low carbon economy.  
 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, a multiplicity of energy systems concurrently provide energy services 
including those based on fuelwood, kerosene, small-scale renewables, large-scale hydro, coal-
fired generation (particularly in South Africa), while there is significant investment in the 
development and export of fossil fuel resources including gas and oil. Despite this, access to 
energy services is lowest in sub-Saharan Africa of any world region, with significant 
implications for reaching the new Sustainable Development Goal to ‘Ensure access to 
affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all’. Furthermore, with the population 
expected to both grow and urbanise over the coming century, the International Energy Agency 
predict that energy demand will grow by around 80% by 2040 in sub-Saharan Africa (IEA 
2014), much of which will be met by expanded use of fossil fuels unless incentives are put in 




In this context, there has been growing interest in how to support the development of low 
carbon energy transitions where  measures “to address energy poverty can also be those that 
would set countries on the much-sought alternative path to low-carbon development (Christian 
Aid 2011). There is also a strong donor discourse about ‘climate-compatible’ development 
which advocates interventions that deliver the ‘triple win’ of poverty alleviation, climate 
adaptation and climate mitigation (Mitchell and Maxwell 2010), mirrored in the concept of 
transformative change for low carbon transitions (Winkel and Dubash 2015). As this narrative 
gathers pace, significant hope is being invested in international climate policy as a means 
through which to contribute to such forms of development Indeed the preamble to the Paris 
Agreement states the ‘need to promote universal access to sustainable energy in developing 
countries, in particular in Africa, through the enhanced deployment of renewable energy’ 
(UNFCCC 2015). At the same time, the growing interest in Africa’s fossil fuel resources 
suggests that any low carbon transition is far from a foregone conclusion. In the rest of this 
section, we draw on recently completed research in South Africa, Kenya and Mozambique to 
examine the ways in which low carbon transitions are (and are not) being fostered.  
 
 
Governing energy system transitions 
 
Under the auspices of the UNFCCC, states are the key actors expected to negotiate and 
implement international agreements. According to transition theory they are expected to 
perform key steering and convening functions among disparate social actors with competing 
interests in order to achieve transformative change (Meadowcroft 2005). Yet conceptually and 
empirically such state-led models of climate policy and energy transitions has been found 
wanting. Research has demonstrated the ever more significant role of transnational forms of 
climate governance and the multiplicity of actors and forms of authority involved in governing 
climate change at different scales alongside, through and with state-based organisations 
(Bulkeley et al. 2014; also UNEP 2015). Moreover, in many settings it is clear the state is not 
in a position to perform key roles in relation to innovation, lacks convening power and 
resources to deliver targets and goals and often also has only limited autonomy to assert policy 
preferences that diverge from those of transnational businesses, donors and other powerful 
states. Especially where they are heavily aid dependent (such as Mozambique) or through 
processes of power sector reform have relinquished a degree of control over the energy system 
to private providers (Tellam 2000; Bayliss and Fine 2007), many states find it hard to set the 
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terms of energy sector reforms aimed at de-carbonisation even if they have the political will to 
undertake them. In the case of Kenya, for example, donors funded and coordinated the 
conclusion of the country’s National Action Plan on Climate Change (Newell et al 2014).  
 
The key point is not that states in such settings are powerless since they still control large parts 
of systems of electricity generation and transmission. It is rather that state capacity and 
autonomy to chart and pursue lower carbon pathways is shaped by their relations with various 
other actors and unevenly distributed. With regard to renewable investments powerful 
countries such as South Africa can induce investors through its RE-IPPP programme 
(Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers Procurement Agreement). For example the 
involvement of Chinese companies in the supply of solar PV technologies such as Yingli Green 
Energy, Suntech, Jinko Solar and Powerway has been facilitated by the South African 
government’s RE IPPPP. But in most cases investments result from commercial and geo-
political interest in new energy resources rather than because of state-led climate policy, 
responding to saturation of domestic markets or attempts to build up global supply chains, as 
is the case with the high levels of interest shown by Chinese solar firms in investing in SSA. 
More problematically still from the point of view of de-carbonisation is the fact that states often 
seek to manage the pace of change on terms which protect key incumbent, often fossil fuel, 
interests even allowing them to determine levels of market access for new independent power 
producers as has occurred in South Africa. This cautions against underestimating the degree of 
incumbency power and the close links between the state and key energy providers often with 
major interests in fossil fuels, or what in the South African context is referred to as the minerals-
energy-complex with key para-statals such as Eskom at its heart (Baker et al 2014). 
 
Rather than it being a matter of a national energy regime being subject to singular transition 
pathways co-ordinated by the nation-state, in the context of SSA multiple forms of energy 
transition are being orchestrated by a range of actors within and beyond the nation-state. What 
we see in practice are competing energy pathways being supported and financed by different 
combinations of business actors, NGOs, donors and parts of the state. Within the Mozambican 
state, for example, FUNAE (Fundo de Energia) has been addressing energy access in areas 
located further from the grid and has developed a focus on renewable energy and rural (off-
grid) electrification funded largely by donors, whilst other elements of the state apparatus such 
as the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy are working together with foreign mining 
and infrastructure companies to pursue hydrocarbon revenue streams and fossil-fuel based 
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power generation. Attention is, therefore, required to the transnational governance of 
transitions (Truffer 2012) as the UNFCCC process seeks to catch up with these new realities 
of energy transition, together with a more nuanced, realistic and desegregated understanding 
of which states are able to deliver which types of transition. This will need to be informed by 
the degree of policy autonomy the state has from investors and donors, as well as attentive to 
uneven capacity within the state to advance transitions in the face of powerful incumbent 
interests.  
 
Levering Change through Carbon Markets and Climate Finance? 
 
The role of market mechanisms in climate policy and enabling de-carbonising continues to be 
un-disputed in the international regime. Thus far the focus has been on the CDM even if the 
role of a broader set of market mechanisms featured in the negotiations at Paris. Since 2001, 
almost 8000 projects have been registered under the CDM, making it the main vehicle for 
transferring private finance into mitigation projects in developing world. Over the 2001 to 2012 
period, the CDM is claimed to have spurred $215 billion in investment and issued 1.46 trillion 
CERs (CDM pipeline 2015). Though it continues to be claimed that the CDM is a pioneer in 
international environmental policy (UNFCCC 2012), the performance of carbon markets has 
dwindled significantly over the past few years, bringing into question their role as drivers of 
‘deep de-carbonisation’. CDM investment has shrunk and many projects are stranded and may 
remain as such until the Paris agreement creates sufficient demand for them. Prices for credits, 
which currently stand at 0.09 EUR per tonne of CO2 equivalent, are at all-time lows and have 
curtailed the inflow of new projects. The CDM has also been rocked by scandals around 
corruption, fraud, double-counting and problems over additionality, meaning that claimed 
emissions reductions have not been taking place (Subbarao and Lloyd 2011). In addition, co-
benefits and developmental gains expected from CDM projects have not been widely 
delivered– in relation to jobs, technology transfer and health outcomes (Sutter & Parreño 2007; 
Das et al 2013). 
Their impact of carbon markets has also been geographically highly uneven. It has long been 
apparent that investor interest sparked by carbon trading did not lead to extensive investments 
in sub-Saharan Africa where CDM projects make up less than 2% of registered projects (CDM 
pipeline 2015). As powerful blocs such as the EU have sought to address this by buying larger 
volumes of credits from least developed countries, there should be potential for countries like 
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to Mozambique to benefit from carbon finance. Yet structural problems around infrastructure, 
access to finance, the low price of electricity and weak regulatory systems continue to inhibit 
market-based mechanisms such as the CDM in SSA. This is in spite of the efforts of 
international institutions such as the World Bank (though its carbon finance assist and market 
readiness programmes for example) and many regional and bilateral donor efforts to boost 
developing country capacity to effectively screen, host and capture benefits from such projects. 
Evidence suggests that in South Africa CDM projects have further entrenched the power of 
elite industrial actors central to the country’s minerals-energy complex such as Eskom and 
Sasol by providing support for large scale industrial or chemical processes (Baker et al 2014). 
These actors have the financial resources to afford the transaction costs associated with 
registering and managing a CDM project and high levels of institutional access to secure 
government support and approval for their projects. Understandably the challenges are even 
greater in Mozambique which has just one CDM project at the validation stage, recently 
approved by the DNA. This project involves switching from coal to natural gas at the rotary 
kiln of a clinker manufacturing plant outside of Maputo. In this context, key barriers to further 
development of carbon markets include low capacity to develop CDM projects, and the lack of 
upfront financing for pre-investment studies of the CDM component of projects.1 
 
Whether future climate finance for ‘clean energy’ comes from carbon markets or other sources, 
the issue will be same: whether it is at a scale and level of certainty that will shift the calculus 
of powerful state and private actors rather than be seen as something which merely reduces risk 
and adds value to existing projects. Securing carbon financing is more often than not an 
afterthought once the viability of a project is already established, but does not in and of itself 
have sufficient financial weight to support more substantial change in energy policy. It is telling 
that in South Africa’s 2010 Integrated Resource Plan the 40 per cent of new electricity 
generation anticipated from renewable energy envisaged feed-in-tariffs as the driver of 
investment, not the CDM or other forms of external finance.2 As one project developer put it: 
‘if there’s one thing I’ve learned it’s don’t base your business on carbon revenue… basing it 
on carbon increases risk’.3 
Given the currently limited scope for carbon markets to finance transitions to lower carbon 
energy systems, alternative sources of climate finance are being sought. Climate aid is clearly 
an important part of the story. Leading donors such as the World Bank have been actively 
(re)positioning themselves to manage the financial flows directed through and beyond the 
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Green Climate Fund (GCF) as well as owning their own portfolio of Climate Investment Funds, 
some $3.75 bn of which was spent controversially co-financing the Medupi coal-fired power 
plant in South Africa. Similarly, the African Development Bank made an overt bid to manage 
a large portion of the funding pledged as part of the Copenhagen Accord and follow-on 
agreements in 2011. Yet given the sums of money required it is increasingly clear that a key 
role for the climate regime, donors and governments is to try to leverage private finance, since 
public funding alone falls short of the mark. It is estimated that the energy sector in non-OECD 
countries would need around US$200 billion of additional investment in clean energy and 
energy efficiency by 2020 (IEA 2010). Mitigation costs in developing countries could reach 
US$140–175 billion a year by 2030. Yet current flows of all climate finance from developed 
to developing countries range from USD 40 to USD 175 billion per year. This includes annual 
flows of up to 50 billion through public institutions and up to USD 125 billion of private finance 
(UNFCCC 2014). Large proportions of climate finance can be classified, therefore, as 
investment.  
 
Problematically  commentators suggest that the “crucial assumption – that donor financing can 
be used to catalyse private investment in clean energy – remains largely untested” (Buntaine 
and Pizer 2014: 2). In SSA, the potential indirect catalytic effects of climate finance are not 
being achieved for the most part. In Mozambique much investment from rising power countries 
is going into business-as-usual carbon-intensive energy trajectories, while aid-donor funding 
is too small scale remains focused on individual projects. Hence, while donor funding is 
catalysing different kinds of socio-technical configurations around everyday energy use, this 
has crucially not yet had an impact in relation to wider energy systems. In South Africa, public 
aid is less important but donors have been supporting their own renewable energy firms is 
seeking to gain commercial footholds in the market.4 Finance and technical assistance from 
European bilateral donors, particularly Denmark and Germany, have been influential in the 
early stages of South Africa’s burgeoning renewable energy industry and have played a 
considerable role in project development, shaping policy, directing research and developing 
the RE IPPPP program 
 
This highlights the need to desegregate different types of finance in order to appreciate what 
role they are realistically able to play in supporting lower carbon energy transitions. There is a 
need to distinguish the assets, instruments and return timeframes of commercial institutions 
such as commercial and investment banks from pension and private equity investors and among 
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non-commercial financial institutions, public development banks from MDBs and sovereign 
wealth funds. There are clearly important regional differences to take into account here too as 
firms with strong relations to Chinese financial institutions such as the China Development 
Bank have secured significant lines of credit for the purpose of expanding sales outside China. 
Each of these financial actors have critical, but different, roles to play in financing competing 
energy trajectories through financing infrastructures, projects, and investments in carbon 
markets such that ‘different transformations need different types of finance’ (Spratt 2015:159).  
 
Levering private finance to address energy poverty, energy security and climate change also 
needs to be balanced with significant disincentives for business-as-usual investments in energy. 
This implies a substantial shift of subsidies and support from the fossil fuel economy to a low 
carbon economy. This is sensitive terrain for donors, concerned about being seen to be pushing 
a low carbon energy agenda in countries where tackling energy access remains the priority, and 
where governments often request funds for fossil fuel development accordingly. While donors 
are investing in off-grid, pro-poor affordable energy, many governments remain wedded to 
high carbon pathways. For example an IFC official in Kenya suggested: ‘With the discovery 
of oil in Turkana and coal in Kitui areas, the government is becoming more assertive. The 
government offered a 1000MW opportunity on coal, but donors and investors are reluctant in 
investing in it because of the greenhouse gas effects’.5 
 
For some commentators, achieving transformational change requires greater levels of national 
ownership over the agenda for low carbon development and a move away from metrics that 
are too tightly coupled to emissions reductions (Winkler and Dubash 2015). Yet a focus on 
national ownership is no panacea, for it neglects what transitions scholars refer to as 
‘landscape’ pressures that are critical in order to re-align the incentives and shift regimes to 
move away from fossil fuels. Climate change and carbon market finance under the UNFCCC 
can help to make lower carbon pathways more attractive by reducing risks for investors, 
offering lines of otherwise unavailable credit and funding projects that are ‘additional’. But the 
CDM or even the GCF are either too small scale or too weak amid low carbon prices, or 
insufficiently advanced , to drive a shift at the landscape or regime level. Transitions studies 
suggests that unless there is alignment between the regime and niche, niches will remain just 
that (Geels 2002). There is a real need for donors and MDBS to help tackle incumbent power 
through shifts in lending practices as well as support to initiatives to reduce fossil fuel subsidies 
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and to apply pressure on private financial actors to divest their investments in fossil fuels. This 




Negotiations about the funding and prioritisation of technology needs have been central to 
international climate debates, featuring in the 1992 UNFCCC discussions and subsequently 
taken up by the Global Environment Facility. They have gained renewed emphasis in the 
context of recent discussions about the technology mechanism and the climate innovation 
centres currently being established. Questions have been asked, however, about what kinds of 
technology and what kinds of transfer can best be supported and whether assumptions inscribed 
in policy bear much resemblance to the practice of design, innovation and diffusion on the 
ground (Ockwell and Bryne 2015). As Ockwell et al. (2008: 4104) have argued, “technology 
transfer needs to be seen as part of a broader process of sustained, low carbon technological 
capacity development in recipient countries and both national and international policy 
interventions are necessary for low-carbon technology transfer”.  
 
As with the other areas of climate policy, there has been a proliferation in the number and types 
of actors involved in technology transfer: Over the past decades, several larger developing 
countries have taken significant steps to strengthen their innovation capabilities, alongside 
which an increasing number of actors – private, public, domestic, international are involved in 
technology transfer (De Coninck and Sagar 2014: 1). Emphasising the plurality of actors is not 
to downplay the role of the state. Quite the contrary. As Rennkamp and Boyd note: “technology 
transfer can be sales-driven or capability-driven. Capability-driven technology transfer can 
benefit local industry development, job creation, and poverty reduction in the longer term. 
These benefits reflect the government’s priorities in its development goals, which appear in 
various policy strategies and plans” (Rennkamp and Boyd 2015: 12). This is vital because, for 
example, South Africa needs cleaner technologies in order to achieve its emissions reduction 
targets, yet very few  of these technologies are manufactured locally.  
 
Rather than being orchestrated through direct transfers of hardware, energy transitions are 
taking place through complex assemblages of technology manufacture, supply and distribution 
involving a dense network of suppliers, contractors and distributors in supply chains spanning 
several countries. Our analysis based on a database of trends in investments by type of actor 
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(e.g. developer, owner, construction, operation or maintenance) energy source and service, 
technology type and provider, project scale and location, levels of grid connectivity and type 
of financing finds a broad range of actors are involved in new renewable energy projects 
constituting approximately 4000 MW of approved generation capacity under South Africa’s 
RE IPPPP. Spain (21 percent), Italy (16 percent) and France (14 percent) are the major players 
in terms of project ownership whilst Spain (22 percent) is also the major project developer  
followed by the US (15 percent) and France (11 percent). Germany (24 percent) and Spain (22 
percent) lead project construction with Denmark third (14 percent). Finance and Investment in 
clean energy in South Africa is led by Spain (14 percent) but closely followed by France (7 
percent) and the UK (5 percent). Following the nature of global trends in innovation and 
manufacturing in renewable energy technologies Germany has a clear lead in terms of the 
origin of clean energy technologies followed by Denmark (17 percent) and Spain (10 percent). 
These loose assemblages of technology developers and providers are organised around 
competing higher and lower energy pathways. Some focus on investments in larger scale 
renewable projects attractive to bigger investors and foreign renewable energy firms supported 
by state policies that are aimed at diversifying the energy mix to supply the grid, such as South 
Africa’s RE IPPP or recent interest in Geothermal energy in Kenya supported by the 
Geothermal Development Corporation (CDKN 2013). The preference is often for pathways 
that deliver a higher return and provide energy for industry given pressure to prioritise growth.  
Then there are carbon-intensive pathways being pursued by ministries of power and energy in 
SSA aimed at luring multinational resource conglomerates such as Vale from Brazil, Tata and 
Oil India and the China National Petroleum Company to invest in new discoveries of gas and 
coal, as in the case in Mozambique and Kenya. Finally there are off-grid renewable energy 
pathways being pursued, often supported by NGOs and with small-scale financing such as 
‘sunny money’, a social enterprise set up by the NGO Solar Aid, as well as European donor 
support but increasingly also the rising powers. For example, Fundo de Energia  (FUNAE) in 
Mozambique received a US$13 million credit line from the Export-Import Bank of India, to 
oversee the construction of Mozambique’s first solar panel assembly plant. In this regard, as 
the New Climate Economy report notes, decentralised options are becoming more attractive 
where the costs of grid expansion are high and where new business models for provision are 
emerging, yet: “care should be taken to ensure that the technologies employed do not imply a 




Building the infrastructures and networks to support, finance and sustain such innovations is 
critical and often not amendable to one-off, donor-driven projects. Effectively technology 
transfer has to shift from the transfer of individual hardware to establishing new socio-technical 
systems if it is to enable low carbon transitions. The terms upon which, and by whom, these 
systems are established is of course critical to their transformative potential. We need to take 
into account the informal networks, the role of innovation system builders which enable 
innovation in more organic ways, though there is a key role for donors as work in Kenya shows 
(Ockwell et al 2014). This is not then a matter of getting the ‘business model’ or ‘price’ right, 
but it is about assembling new systems, and that requires all kinds of social, cultural and 
political work alongside creating markets, in particular developing domestic ‘capability’ for 
technology. This challenges the increasingly popular but uncritical narrative which reduces the 
role of technology to questions of ‘scaling-up’ and of ‘de-risking’ private finance rather than 
paying sufficient attention to the range of actors that have to be enrolled in technology 
development and diffusion if it is to be both socially and environmentally beneficial.  
 
Conclusions: Implications for Climate Policy  
 
The challenge of decarbonisation entails multiple requirements, drivers and dimensions. 
Addressing climate change is central to this challenge and the policy architecture built up 
around the UNFCCC critical to its achievement. Yet given the diversity of actors and drivers 
and the limited direct reach and influence of international climate policy, there is an urgent 
need to consider how the climate regime can best support the embryonic transitions that are 
slowly taking form around the world in ways that it has failed to thus far. To do this effectively, 
we have argued, requires moving beyond notions of a cohesive state serving as rule-enforcer 
and transition manager. It also requires a broader view of technology, not just as hardware that 
is transferred, but as a set of practices and networks of expertise and enabling actors. And while 
markets have an important role to play as vehicles for achieving broader ends, they are not an 
end in themselves but rather one (and not the only) tool capable of shifting socio-technical 
systems in lower carbon directions. Further, while acknowledging the important role of climate 
aid, often as a multiplier or facilitator of more ambitious private flows, it is critical to 
differentiate between the types of finance required for different transitions, some of which will 




In sum, the transition to a low carbon economy is being built in ways and in numerous sites 
that the climate regime needs to be cognisant of and engage with productively. Critical 
decisions about constructing, financing and politically embedding (low) carbon pathways are 
being made by a vast range of actors in numerous arenas in ways not directly shaped by the 
climate regime, but where a greater appreciation of them can improve the effectiveness of 
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